Is the Mortgage Sector the Next Systemic Event?
November 16, 2026 | Which is more important to the US economy, housing or the surreal world of AI spend? Housing is a massive pillar of the traditional economy. Consumer spending makes up roughly 70% of U.S. economic activity, and residential real estate heavily influences household wealth, construction jobs, and local services. About 10 million people work in housing broadly defined.
Residential housing investment has been a primary anchor of U.S. fixed investment, reaching roughly $748 billion in Q2 2026, according to Urban Institute. But the U.S. faces a severe structural shortage of millions of homes, constrained by high mortgage rates and construction costs. Sales of existing homes are at a 16-year low and loan volumes are falling.
At the same time, quarterly spending on data centers and information processing hardware for the AI bubble climbed to $752 billion in Q2 2026, slightly surpassing residential housing investment for the first time. But is investment in the electronic parrot known as AI really a path to higher productivity and economic growth? Or is it simply a massive misallocation of resources designed to generate equally massive profits for a few insiders?
In this issue of The Institutional Risk Analyst, we feature a deep dive on the US residential mortgage sector, the latest addition to our suite of proprietary analytics covering large banks, finance companies and precious metals. Our residential mortgage group includes lenders, REITS, realtors and private mortgage insurers, the major components of an ecosystem that depends fundamentally on the level of LT interest rates and loan volumes.
“Among the nation’s 200 largest housing markets, 105 metro areas have active inventory above 2019 pre-pandemic levels,” notes Lance Lambert. “That growing slack has coincided with homebuyers gaining more power in more markets.” Yet even though we are in a buyers market, the level of interest rates and seller resistance are causing transaction volumes to plummet.
A number of economists are critical of Fed Chairman Kevin Warsh for not raising the target for short-term interest rates more quickly to combat inflation, mostly from the war with Iran. Watch food prices rise in the New Year, as John Dizard predicted in our discussions this year. But could it be that Warsh and his inner circle know that the US financial sector is already swooning under the pressure of sharply higher LT interest rates?
Now you can argue, incorrectly, that a 7.5% 30-year fixed rate mortgage is not unusual in historical terms going back 45 years to the days of Fed Chairman Paul Volcker. But the more important measure is the change in mortgage rates since the summer of 2020, when lenders were writing loans with 1.5% and 2% coupons compared with 7.5s today.
In the third quarter of 2026, unrealized bond losses for large and regional U.S. banks saw earlier improvements reversed, with many institutions experiencing substantial increases in losses on available-for-sale (AFS) and held-to-maturity (HTM) securities and also loans. The excessive policy actions of the FOMC during and immediately after COVID cost banks and the Fed itself trillions in losses, but does the change in interest rates since 2020 now threaten the housing sector with catastrophe?

Source: dataQollab
Rising interest rates lead to lower lending volumes which lead to lower profits and rising debt finance by nonbank mortgage lenders. United Wholesale Mortgage Corp (UWMC) was an extreme example and almost failed at the end of Q2 2026. Significantly, sharply higher interest rates start to force down the value of mortgage servicing assets as profitable refinance transactions disappear, rendering the option to recapture a customer irrelevant to valuations.

Source: Mortgage Bankers Association
If you compare the monthly projections published by the MBA over the past year, the estimates for refinance transactions have been steadily falling to below 30% of total volumes. This suggests that the modelled valuation for recapture as part of the fair value of mortgage servicing rights (MSRs) should also be falling or zeroed out entirely.
A borrower with a COVID-era 3% fixed rate 30-year mortgage is more likely to get a second lien mortgage rather than refinance, raising a significant question as to the value of recapture in MSR valuations. Mortgage servicing rights (MSRs) display negative convexity, which is actually opposite to the positive convexity of a standard non-callable bond/loan.
The non-linear behavior of borrowers and thus recapture adds to the complexity of owning and hedging MSRs. It is obvious that MSR values can fall faster than bond prices in a falling interest rate environment because of prepayments, thus negative convexity. But how do we describe the falling value of recapture in a rising interest rate environment? The answer is that it depends entirely upon the pool of mortgages, the average coupon rate and other idiosyncratic factors specific to the borrower.
A number of observers have speculated about the over-levered AI sector providing a systemic catalyst that would force the FOMC to cut short-term interest rates. We think that a more likely scenario involves a large nonbank government lender that literally runs runs out of collateral, cash and bank financing in a rising interest rate regime. With delinquency on FHA loans near 12% and rising, and seriously delinquent loans at 6%, many smaller Ginnie Mae servicers are losing money.

Source: Ginnie Mae
The notable example of UWMC, which has a 60/40 ratio between conventional loans and government insured assets in its production profile, was saved by a $1.5 billion capital infusion from Brookfield Corp (BN) unit Oaktree Management. Who will catch the falling sushi knife next time a nonbank mortgage firm runs out of cash?
Between 2020 and mid-November 2026, the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield has increased by approximately +476.0% in relative terms, or +4.26 percentage points (+426 basis points). This calculation compares the 2020 full-year monthly average of 0.89% to the latest market close of 5.15% on November 13, 2026. Is it reasonable to expect nonbank mortgage firms dependent on market financing to manage such a large magnitude change?
Below is the inaugural version of the WGA Residential Mortgage Top 25, which includes the results from our 36 stock test group. We use the same five factor model for our bank group for the mortgage group. The average 200-day moving average for the 36 stock test group was negative 22% as of Friday's close.
WGA Residential Mortgage Top 25

It is interesting to note that a number of names on the list above are sellers of MSRs. UWMC has been attempting to sell $1.8 billion in unpaid principal balance (UPB) of conventional and government servicing, but so far UWMC has not disclosed any progress to its anxious shareholders.
We reported earlier (“Trading Points: Is United Wholesale Mortgage Corp a Buy?”) that UWMC had agreed to sell the conventional MSRs to JPMorganChase (JPM), but the bank has refused to confirm the transaction. We hear that Chase took the full $60 billion in the lows 6s in terms of multiple, but the House of Morgan insisted on rough reps & warranties. Bottom line was JPM was the only buyer for the UWMC conventional servicing, but the Ginnie Mae MSRs may be unsalable.
In a shocking development, Ellington Financial (EFC) just announced that it completed the sale of its mortgage servicing rights (MSR)–related investments and excess servicing spread investments. Is this a good time to be selling MSRs, before LT interest rates move higher and the value of potential recapture shrinks further?
Bottom line: We think that the mortgage sector is already in distress because of the level of LT interest rates, rising delinquency and the falling volume of loan originations. If the FOMC raises the target for Fed funds and repo rates, the negative impact on the long end of the yield curve could create a systemic event in the world of nonbank mortgages, both because of the further negative impact on lending volumes and the related adverse impact on MSR valuations.
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