The Institutional Risk Analyst

LC is clearly succeeding where the larger banks are not in terms of both loan originations and loan sales, which are shown in the chart below. If LC can continue to create assets and also sell loans to investors, that is an indication of a healthy business. But the big question for us is how much of the consumer lending opportunity can LC capture and retain? The table below shows the gross loan yield, net loss rate and net income vs average assets for LC and its bank competi

When the Fed took net loan loss rates for banks down to ~ 50% of par in 2021 vs 95% after 2008, they enabled some very stupid and foolish behavior by investors and lenders. These behaviors are only partly described by the nominal level of interest rates because, of course, we must account for leverage in calculating the full scope of the prospectives losses. Lend More Upon Default (LMUD) has concealed the scope of the disaster and even pushed down reported loan default rates.

Half of COF assets are allocated to consumer loans, with single digits in real estate and C&I exposures. The bank was in the 94th percentile of Peer Group 1 on nonaccrual real estate loans in Q3, the 97th percentile in 90+ day past due C&I loans and the 94th percentile in 90+ day past due for other loans and leases, which includes loans to nonbanks. We expect COF to have high levels of delinquency in its consumer book, but these other credit metrics are a little troubling.

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